

The Second Migration: Displacement and Refugees from Rawalpindi during Partition

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While the trauma in forced migration - leaving one's home - remains an uncontested emotive domain, any experience of frequent movement suggests a better ability to resettle in a new place. This paper shows that through a history of frequent migration, a separate class among Punjabis emerged that was mobile, resourceful, and modern in its outlook. The commonsensical approach to resettlement, which they display after the Partition, is derived from such a mobile history. This article focuses on the last mass migration, before 1947, that took place in the late 19th century. Hindus and Sikhs from East Punjab had migrated to West Punjab (now Pakistan) following the British project of agrarian colonisation. These very migrants and their descendants were forced to migrate back to India with the creation of Muslim Pakistan in mid 20th century. In their actual and inherited memory, Partition was the second displacement they had experienced.

The family thus is quite familiar with migrations, displacements and the lot of refugees; the last migration having taken place from Rawalpindi after the Partition of the country in 1947.¹

Uprooting in its antonymous sense suggests deep roots in a given place. One way to understand uprooting is to follow its aftermath as experienced by ordinary people. Another way is to dig backwards and deeper into the very 'roots' that bind people with places to understand the historical depth and intensity of that association. In other words, to open the meanings of uprooting or displacement in a way that does not restrict one's analytical vision to specific historical events or locations of displacement.² The 1947 forced migration across the Punjab borders is one such instance wherein the notion of 'roots' - as fixed, unchanging, and stable - is challenged when explored deeper backwards. We are confronted with another mass migration, though voluntary, that precedes the forced migration of Partition by roughly half a century when the colonial state established a network of irrigation canals, townships and villages in West Punjab. The Punjabi roots *appear less fixed and more mobile* when the 19th century canal colony migration is brought into our analytical orbit.³

'Place of Origin'

How are people's roots in a place determined and how is that knowledge obtained for research purposes? A big challenge of any such exploration is to frame the 'right questions' that make sense to the very people who should

answer them. The questions must speak a language that ordinary people understand and relate to. This came out very clearly when I conducted the personal interviews during fieldwork. It must be mentioned that most of the interviews were conducted in Punjabi or Hindi where the questions and their implied meanings are quite different from the English language. A very common question in English, like 'where do you come from?' when asked in Hindi '*aap kahan se hain*' does not give one but two answers, that is, (a) *padaishi* or place of birth and (b) *pushtaini* or place of ancestors or a place where many generations of the same family have lived. The nature of the association might be a bit different, yet the claim of belonging often remains just as intense.

This dual notion of belonging became apparent at the very beginning when the quantitative survey was conducted. The questionnaire had been set upon predictable lines with a section reserved for pre-Partition personal information like age, place of birth, occupation, education income etc. The column 'place of birth' was intended as an identification mark, a location in Pakistan the respondents identified themselves with. Apparently there was no straight answer to this question because the respondents insisted that though they were born in a given place, they belonged some place else also. The answer to this query, in most cases, produced two or even more locations in Pakistan and India as places of origin. Such responses could not be used for the data one requires for a quantitative analysis especially when the questionnaire is not designed for that purpose. The unexpected dual, or even multiple, locations offered as places of origin suggested that the present migrants and their ancestors had moved from one place to another on more occasions than one. Their relocation in Delhi, therefore, was just one of the latest movements their families had experienced. For instance, Saran Kapoor, born 1932, named Sargodha in Pakistan as her place of birth but added that she did not really belong there because her ancestral village was located in Gurdaspur district in the Indian Punjab.⁴ Clearly for her, both Sargodha and Gurdaspur were as important locations for her as her current place of residence in Delhi. Kapoor's claim is a typical claim, of belonging to multiple places, common to many Punjabi migrants.

The mass migration following the 1947 Partition was, in many ways, a second migratory experience for those displaced from Punjab and NWFP. The region is characterised by a high degree of mobility both within and outside the provinces suggesting that the displacement in 1947 was not a unique occurrence rather part of a series of population movements. The last mass population displacement in Punjab, before 1947, took place at the turn of the 19th century when the colonial administration embarked on the project of building a hydraulic network throughout the region. The newly built canals opened possibilities for agriculture in previously uncultivable land leading to the growth of new urban and rural settlements in the West Punjab area that later became Pakistan. The new areas were populated by both Hindu and Sikh settlers from East Punjab, now in India, who at the time of Partition had to return to their original homelands in East Punjab. While Sikhs were recruited as peasant cultivators, the Hindus circumvented the laws that barred non-cultivators from

owning land and bought farmland in the commercially successful canal colonies or set up trading posts. Thus, displacement in itself is far from being a rare occurrence among the Punjabis. The migration under the colonial aegis, however, catalysed the formation of a new middle class whose experiences of frequent mobility shaped their response to the challenges of 1947 migration and resettlement.

Punjab – Migration in Continuum

The late 19th century canal colony population movement to West Punjab, now in Pakistan, provides an unusual point of departure for explorations of Partition displacement. To begin with, it helps 'normalise' displacement since it appears as a frequent feature of Punjabi life. The canal colony migration, in itself, is crucial in understanding Punjabi social structures and religious ideologies because they underwent radical transformations with the creation of a new auxiliary class in Punjab. The study of Partition migration as a yet another instance of migration within Punjab helps one to challenge a constant theme, especially in the later works on Partition, that focuses on the 'unimaginable trauma' in leaving one's homes and native places.⁵ This somehow leaves the processes and meanings of actual migration largely unexplored. The commonly used description of Partition migration as 'uprooting' leads one to question how 'rooted' and sedentary was pre-partition life in Punjab. How did people respond to movement in a region that has historically been regarded as highly mobile? How do people with frequent histories of migration, over a single or several generations, perceive such unsettled moments? These questions are pertinent to our understanding of migration from the Punjab province since its history is marked by tumultuous invasions, battles and population movements.

The geo-strategic location of undivided Punjab - the first fertile plains after the rough Himalayan mountain terrain - made it an obvious stop for most adventurers and invaders following the Central Asian route into India.⁶ The British annexation of Punjab in 1849 was consolidated over the years by extensive building of canal and rail networks and attempts to decongest fertile and overpopulated areas of eastern Punjab by relocating people in the new canal colonies. Ironically, it was the same relocated population from east to west Punjab that had to be moved back amid partition violence half a century later. Conservative estimates suggest that one out of every five Hindu and Sikh Partition migrants were 'colonists' who had moved to western Punjab before and at the turn of 19th century.⁷ In many cases people had experienced the whole process of dislocation and resettlement twice in their lifetimes. The obvious contrast between these two types of migration - canal colony and partition - must be pointed out in that the former was neither forced nor preceded by violence.

Most scholarly accounts – such as those of Ali, Fox and Islam - of canal colony settlements are bereft of personal experiences and stories of individuals who undertook seemingly grave risks. There could be several reasons for this lacuna: one that the writing of people-centred histories - exemplified in

subaltern studies and oral testimonies of Partition survivors - is a recent development in Indian historiography. Secondly, the extensive focus on the political-economic rationale of the canal colonies disallows any enquiry into the process of movement and readjustment in which people, social orders, systems of government etc appear as independent dimensions and actors and not as miniscule parts of a colonial experiment in governmental techniques. Thirdly, the absence of physical violence - either communal as during Partition or state-orchestrated - means that these events do not excite dramatic or prurient interest. The obvious question then is whether personal experiences and memories of such a process fail to permeate the accounts of history. Does their absence imply that they cease to exist altogether? Do they manifest themselves in other modes? Do such migratory experiences, either lived through or inherited from previous generations, demystify the linkages between people and their native places, especially when the location of native places itself is frequently disrupted?

This paper focuses on the duplicated experience of migration through the journey of a displaced family of farmers who moved twice within the Punjab province in less than half a century. The main argument pursued here concerns the late 19th century westward migration induced by colonial intervention that produced an entire class of 'auxiliary colonists' catalysed simultaneously by socio-religious reorganisation in Punjab. This class experienced the later Partition migration and resettlement in a comparatively privileged way compared to the 'ordinary subjects' of British colonial state. The term 'auxiliary colonist' and its specific usage in this text need some prior explanations. Most relationships that describe conditions of subjectivity, for example patron-client or citizen-state, are based on multiple dimensions of ranks, hierarchies, notions of inferiority-superiority that rests on an unequal balance of power. While coercion and the use of violence to maintain subjectivity is inherent in these interactions, it needs to be emphasised that often such relationships are based on mutual dependence and inextricability. In colonial Punjab, subjectivity is partially nurtured by mutual dependence and does not completely rest upon coercion and violent domination. The mutual and collaborative spirit in Punjab was sealed with land endowments in colonies to already influential and landed individuals who return the gesture by providing steady support to the colonial military with new recruits, mules and by suppressing minor anti-British revolts in the region. In brief, though the colonial state had envisaged and sketched the project of colonisation in western Punjab, its implementation was sub-contracted to the local Punjab elite. An interesting aspect of this agrarian colonisation concerns the Punjabi Hindus - primarily traders and businessmen - who were not considered prime recruitment material by the colonial state since they neither belonged to the martial category nor to the peasant-cultivator category. Despite the lack of encouragement by the British, Hindu traders succeeded in owning agricultural land in the new colonies in West Punjab.

Broad comparisons may be made with *Bhadralok* or the 'respectable folk' in Bengal who occupied position of influence in the colonial set-up and later became the 'principal agents of nationalism in colonial Bengal'.⁸ The 'colonial middle class' as Chatterjee describes it, was created in a relation of

subordination in one position but in a position of dominance in another, that is, in terms of cultural leadership of the colonised people. If the Bengal elite were to be contrasted with the elite in Punjab, then the entire project of constructing irrigation and rail systems, new towns and model villages in otherwise thinly populated regions of western Punjab, created altogether different circumstances in which the colonial elite in Punjab was favoured. In a way, western Punjab provided an almost clean slate on which the colonial state experimented with its ideas of civilisation by creating ideal types of rural and urban spaces. In this process the colonial state authenticated its own notions of social order among the natives by the spatial placement of different caste and community groups in the newly created habitats. As will follow in this paper, the collusion of land grants, military requirements, and colonial interpretation of local social hierarchies created a new auxiliary class in Punjab whose subordination was balanced by the colonial need to collaborate with the local elite.

On Method – Class, Caste and Social Reorganisation

The emergence of a new class sympathetic to the colonial state is one of the central themes in this paper. The colonial intervention visible in the investigative surveys, population transfers, military recruitment catalysed the formation of a social class in Punjab that assumed a dominant position after the Partition in 1947. The historicity and modalities of this social class cannot be understood purely in class terms because they are entwined with the complexities of caste and religious formations in Punjab. The overlapping character of Indian social organisation is evident in the scholarly writings that often perceive ‘class based political action’ as being camouflaged behind the more apparent religious or communal consciousness.⁹ Thus in India, social groups, structures and their patterns of hierarchy have always presented a methodological challenge to researchers. The complexities are accentuated even further since social organisations differ from region to region all over India, leaving little room for a uniform explanatory model.

In many ways, social reality in India represents an esoteric subject, to which entry can only be gained through the observable variables like religion and caste.¹⁰ Therefore, in the early conceptual writings on Indian society, the caste system was seen by writers such as Dumont as an ‘extreme form of social stratification’ that could not coexist with class based hierarchies. This echoes Marx’s idea of Asiatic modes of production - characterised by absence of private property and the static nature of the economy brought about by peculiar links between caste, agriculture and production - where India (and China) were considered an exception to the otherwise universal logic of historical materialism.¹¹ Weber continued the idea of India as an exception in his understanding of ‘status groups’ where he described caste groups as being closed with little scope for internal dynamism. Though both Marx and Weber have had a marked influence on writings on Indian social stratification, the archetype of caste system has since been revised. It is commonly accepted now that ‘ramifications of class can be seen in a given caste, and a caste can be

observed in different classes.’¹² Otherwise it would be impossible to explain poor segments in upper castes and prosperous groups within lower castes. The issue, then, is to derive a class-caste stratification basis since societies, for example in South Asia, cannot be explained by class analysis alone. To explore this further, we first need to look at caste and class as separate analytical categories and find those features that impinge on and align these two categories.

In terms of caste groups, ‘degree of closure of mobility chances’ as Giddens has argued, should be considered significant because this idea (in different forms) has been central in distinguishing class from caste. A good example are the writings of the French sociologist Louis Dumont whose systematic expostulation of castes, called ‘Homo Hierarchicus’, has become a dominant point of reference, both as a source and as an ‘orientalist’ critique. Evidently, hierarchy is crucial in understanding Dumont’s caste system and mobility within the hierarchy is considered difficult because there is a ‘ritual hierarchy’ which is dependent upon a state of mind and is not influenced by secular forces of economics and politics. What we see, then, is a Hindu caste order without any internal dissent and dynamism and therefore, embodied as a totally separate human species, *homo hierarchicus*.

The caste system is commonly presented as a fourfold structure with *Brahmin* (priest or intellectual) at the top, followed by *Kshatriya* (warrior, ruler-prince), *Vaishya* (merchant) and *Shudra* (farmer, artisan) at the bottom. The category of untouchables, *achhut*, *dalit* is kept outside this top Brahmin-down Shudra hierarchy. Much of this understanding is based upon travelogues written by European, Chinese and Arab scholar-missionaries in the colonial and pre-colonial period. However, it is in the colonial writings on native society that caste as an institution takes a concrete form. A notable and rather detailed description in this period was made by a French missionary, Abbé Dubois who came to India just after the French revolution.¹³ He noted the uncontested superiority of Brahmins and absolute inferiority of what he called pariah castes in the social system. He came to believe that in between these two extremes all other identifiable groups were hierarchically arranged. The enormous complexities of social relations negotiated through caste practices are, somehow, lost in this simplistic structure. It needs to be pointed out that, although caste is based on the principle of natural superiority, it is not physical prowess or intelligence that measures this superiority but endowment of bodily purity. Unlike race or gender where bodily features mark obvious and tangible differences, caste has no such clear markers. This is where social practices, occupations, lifestyles, rituals and taboos become significant for they are used explicitly and routinely to demonstrate the differences for everyone to see.

Another notable influence in defining castes has been the practices of population census undertaken by British colonial authorities. Historians and sociologists alike regard the first census conducted in 1881 as a turning point when for the first time people were asked to state their religious and caste affiliations for administrative purposes.¹⁴ In this colonial-bureaucratic project the idea of viewing castes as real, fixed and eternal entities was not merely an

effort to understand processes and boundaries in social formation, but a concrete exercise in collecting and standardising knowledge about colonial subjects for administrative purposes. Denzil Ibbetson, the officer in-charge of the demographic surveys, identified castes as hereditary entities (and therefore unchangeable) separated on the principle of 'division of labour' in a given society, a bit like 'the trade guilds of medieval Europe.'¹⁵ He further described caste groups as 'corporate communities or guilds held together by the tie of common occupation rather than of common blood, each guild being self contained and self governed, and bound by strict rules, the common object of which is to strengthen the guild and to confine it to the secrets of the craft it practices.'¹⁶

Though he duly recorded and acknowledged that a vast variety of caste affiliations exist, he arranged them around the simple and legible four-caste model. The groups that were ambiguously situated in this model were asked to define their position or were simply attached to one of the broad categories as sub-castes. The colonial caste classifications, however misplaced, have had a profound impact on the way caste was treated not only in administrative matters but also within academia.

This deterministic and static description of caste has been challenged in recent scholarship on Indian social structures. A significant departure has been to define castes as discrete (exclusive categories) and the hierarchy of their placement arranged not in vertical but rather in continuity¹⁷ This releases caste groups from their social immobility that would otherwise be rendered impossible. Separation of these groups from the vertical caste span is made possible through studies of 'myths of origin' of each caste where the middle and lower castes do not necessarily see themselves as inferior to Brahmins.¹⁸ An important marker of caste distinction is the acceptance of food on a purity-pollution scale i.e. one shares food with members of equal or higher caste groups. But each caste makes its own rules of hierarchy and there is no unanimity regarding who can share food with whom. Caste mobility is also achieved through an active process of reinvention, or *sanskritization* where the lower castes adopt the ideal standards of upper castes especially if, by doing so, they gain access to economic and political power. Generally speaking the purity-pollution measures evolve around occupation. The further one is away from earth/soil, the higher the step on the social ladder i.e. Brahmins with abstract or priestly assignments are to be on top while farmers who till the earth are at the bottom. The consumption of meat and alcohol is impure and inferior and renouncing them offers upward mobility; women - control over female sexuality through rituals, prohibition of widow remarriage.¹⁹ Caste names with Sanskrit origins assume higher status which is why many lower castes with aboriginal names take recourse to name change as a mobility strategy. Mobility within caste order is possible, assuming that economic and political gains have been made, and is routinely practiced by caste groups to alter power relations in a given place.

In Punjab, the social restructuring took place largely around the agrarian castes like Jats, on one hand, and Hindu commercial castes like Khatri, Bania

and Arora, on the other hand. These castes had acquired greater economic influence under colonial rule. The acquisition of land was a prime concern since 'land remained overwhelmingly the single most important source of wealth.'²⁰ The importance of land in a primarily agrarian land is obvious but it is also necessary to understand the nature of physical and social mobility in Punjab. The ownership of land as a symbol of social status, *izzat*, is also often pointed out as one of the explanations for political struggles around the attainment of land in the canal colonies. While Jats gained land resources through the largesse of the colonial state, the Hindu commercial castes often exploited legal loopholes - like *benami* land sales - in the state legislation to acquire agricultural land. *Benami* literally means being without name and in terms of land sale it meant buying land not in one's own name. The Hindu traders could invest their surplus wealth in the new agricultural land by buying land under false names. The opening of the new lands in West Punjab created a number of possibilities for various social groups to manoeuvre, given their social mobility, even though the colonial state was merely seeking to reproduce the social patterns prevalent in the more populated East Punjab. The ownership of land and the associated prestige had a significant impact upon the caste-based social hierarchy. The most visible change was the demotion of Brahmins from the top caste position since they neither had land nor wealth to support their social claims. Their priestly, intellectual functions had little value once the religious reform movements - like Arya Samaj - began taking roots in Punjab, which since the 15th century had been the site of anti-Brahminical spiritual traditions like Sikhism. A clear marker of this change is the way Brahmins are addressed among Punjabis. They are called Bahman, which is a rude rendition of the word Brahmin suggesting a demoted social position. The top position was now taken over by the wealthy landed class comprising Sikh Jats and Hindu commercial castes.

This fluidity in social organisation was sealed once the colonial state enacted legislation around the late 19th century based on the outcome of detailed population censuses and district settlement reports undertaken soon after the annexation of Punjab in 1849. The settlers in the new canal colonies - farmers and traders - also experienced a boom in their personal and collective wealth due to increased agricultural production and commercial activity. The economic gain by the intermediate castes like Jats, Khatri, Aroras and Baniyas was soon turned into social gain through the increasingly successful new religious reform movements like Arya Samaj and Singh Sabhas. Though the centre of these reform movements was in East Punjab - mainly Lahore and Amritsar - they spread rapidly throughout the new colony lands in West Punjab. Thus, the variable of caste appears to be as fluid and mobile as social class.

Sub-contracting the Colonial Project

Between 1880s and 1920s, the colonial state undertook massive construction and maintenance of irrigation canals in arid wastelands of western Punjab, which produced 'one of the largest irrigation systems in the world'.²¹ It is

variously described as 'agricultural colonisation' or profit-making venture in 'state capitalism' as by Fox or the British 'hydraulic regime' as by Islam. The motive of this policy is often ascribed by such writers as Fox and Islam as preventive measures against famine and to provide safe employment for the Sikh soldiers and the evolving economic relations between Britain and India that induced capital for the canal construction to be raised on the London stock market.

Richard Fox explains it as a necessary outcome of the policy of 'cheap government' employed by the British, which entailed accumulation of as much wealth as possible 'without major alterations to the Indian society, without massive investment in India's economy, and without excessive expenditures on colonial government.'²² In other words, to increase the revenue receipts and decrease government expenses without meddling too much in the local affairs. The construction of canal colonies offered such prospects since they were expected to be export-oriented and profit-making ventures. The best revenues yields could be obtained if small peasant proprietors were created instead of large landholdings since this would eliminate the intermediaries between the government and the actual producers.

At the very inception of the canal colony project, the yield from the colonies was a little less than the total yield from the fertile plains of central Punjab. But by the beginning of the 20th century the agricultural scope of the colonies was fully realised. The new areas were yielding wheat exports as much as two and a half times greater than the net exports from the central Punjab. Thus, the British planners were not too far off the mark in expecting increased revenue from the canal areas. However, a focus on the hydro-economic logic of 'agricultural colonisation' shrouds the social-political intent that is so central to the entire policy in that the 'granting of commercially valuable canal colony land was both an economic and a political process, which created beneficiaries that had acquired landed resources and were thereby beholden to the state.'²³ It is clear that the government had to tread a thin line rope since it needed to accommodate the indigenous power-holders while simultaneously creating an independent auxiliary class. The land grants were, therefore, made on a variety of policy principles rather than a single guiding principle. They included large grants to upper caste influential men and religious leaders in the region, small peasant proprietors, demobilised soldiers who reverted to farming, as well as low caste soldiers who had served the British loyally.

The sparsely inhabited 'crown wastelands', in the districts of Multan, Montgomery, Gujranwala, Jhang, Lyallpur, Sialkot, Gujrat and Lahore, opened number of opportunities for the state to experiment with and establish practices of governance. The socio-political component of the policy became evident once the colony land was ready to be allotted and cultivated. The central question - who should inhabit the newly irrigated lands - was crucial in (a) creating loyal subjects, and, (b) influencing prevalent social hierarchies in the Punjab. The land allotment fell into two broad categories - imperial grants in lieu of military and bureaucratic services rendered to the colonial state, and open auctions where land was purchased by the well-off sections of Punjab

society. The award of imperial grants offered scope to the state in manoeuvring individuals, caste and religious groups to garner and reward loyalty shown to the state. The prime consideration in land allotment was the agricultural skill and, therefore, the prosperous landholding families of central Punjab were deemed to be the obvious source of recruitment.

The same areas of Punjab were also the major recruiting grounds for Sikh soldiers who were usually drawn from the traditional farming lineages. Thus, the twin concepts of 'martial races' - Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, Rajputs, and 'agricultural castes' - *Jats*, *Arains* among others, were used to determine the skillfulness of incumbent settlers. The specific professional expertise associated with specific castes was given a hegemonic form under the Land Alienation Act, 1900 which prescribed ownership and occupation of colony land only to the notified agricultural castes. Gerald Barrier calls it 'the greatest single piece of social engineering ever attempted in India' according to which tribes and castes were designated as naturally suited to agriculture or not.²⁴ *Jats* among Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus were obviously the preferred group because of their traditional association with farming. They were described as 'ethnologically (.) the peculiar and most prominent product of the plains of five rivers' and 'stalwart, sturdy yeomen of great independence, industry, and agricultural skill, and (who) collectively form perhaps the finest peasantry in India.'²⁵

Table 1: Colonisation in West Punjab

Name of colony	Period of colonisation	Districts
Sidhnai	1886-1888	Multan
Sohag Para	1886-1888	Montgomery
Chunian	1896-1898	Lahore
Chenab	1892-1905	Gujranwala, Jhang, Lyallpur, Lahore,
	1926-1930	Sheikhupura
Jhelum	1902-1906	Shapur, Jhang
Lower Bari Doab	1914-1924	Montgomery, Multan
Upper Chenab	1915-1919	Gujranwala, Sialkot, Sheikhupura
Upper Jhelum	1916-1921	Gujrat
Nili Bar	1926 till 1940's	Montgomery, Multan

Source: Imran Ali (1988, p. 9)

The Sikh *Jats* were especially favoured for they combined agricultural skills with the attributes of a martial race as is evident in the following passage.

A colony could have hardly had better material, for Ludhiana, Jullunder and Amritsar represents the flower of Indian agriculture. They are the home of the Jat Sikh, who has been described as 'the most desirable colonists'. It would be difficult to say which of the

three has produced the best type: for industry and thrift, the Ludhiana Sikh is hard to beat, and the Sikh from Amritsar, though he may be spendthrift and violent, is unsurpassed as a cultivator. Grit, skill in farming, and fine physique are characteristics common to all, and in new environment the Jat Sikh has reached a point of development probably beyond anything else of the kind in India. In less than a generation he has made the wilderness blossom like the rose. It is as if the energy of the virgin soil of the Bar had passed into his veins and made him a part of the forces of nature which he has conquered.²⁶

The representation of *Jats* as ideal entrepreneurial cultivators explains why they formed the single largest caste group in the colonies. In Sidhani colony, for example, *Jats* made up 75 percent of the land grantees; in Sohag Para, 61 percent and in Chenab a quarter of the total population.²⁷ *Jats* received the largest share of land in all colonies with 675,000 acres, of which 230,000 acres went to Muslims *Jats* and the rest to Hindu and Sikh *Jats*.²⁸ The recruitment of the future 'colonists' was conducted in a concerted manner from the seven districts of central Punjab - Ambala, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Jullunder, Ludhiana and Sialkot - where the most skilled agriculturalists were said to live. Broadly, three basic types of grants were adopted - peasant (13-50 acres), yeoman (50-150 acres) and capitalist, or *rais* (150-600 acres) of which 80 percent of the allotted land went to the small-medium holders. The new arrangement excluded the poor and landless from access to the land though the traditional 'service class' - village barbers, menials, low caste labourers - could join the newly-established villages in their traditional capacities. The far-reaching implications of the Alienation Act were limited to the poor non-agriculturist castes since the rich non-agriculturist could always buy land at the open auctions.

The distinction between the agrarian and non-agrarian castes needs to be elaborated on to understand how the intervention of the colonial state catalysed the re-organisation of social distinctions and hierarchies. The Punjab Land Alienation Act was basically introduced to safeguard peasant proprietors from dispossession of their land to pay off mortgages. The sole beneficiary in this transaction was the creditor, or the local money-lender who would come to own tracts of land that he himself did not cultivate. Thus, to stop alienation of peasants from their land, the state stopped sale or transfer of land that was owned and cultivated by peasant proprietors. There was a growing fear among the colonial administrators that loss of land by the peasants would cause social unrest that would ultimately challenge the government.²⁹ Another reason was the traditional occupations pursued by different castes and tribes that, in a way, divided the Punjab economy on communal lines. While most of the moneylenders were Hindus (Baniyas, Khatri and Aroras) of the intermediate caste groups, the peasants were mostly Muslims or Sikhs (*Jats*). The government effort, therefore, was to check the Hindu commercial castes from dominating and usurping the economy.

Mufakharul Islam argues that the government hardly succeeded in its goal of 'wiping out the moneylenders from the land transfer market.'³⁰ The availability of surplus funds at this juncture was an important precondition in the competition for land resources. The rural non-agricultural classes came to possess these funds due to three important features of Punjab society. One, the colonial presence in Punjab from 1849 onwards meant that agricultural production had become integrated in the world agrarian market, leading to an increase in the sale of agricultural produce both in absolute and relative terms. And while the state had been able to restructure the landholding patterns, it had not been able to provide credit facilities to the peasant proprietors. The village moneylender, therefore, still remained the biggest source of credit through which the peasant proprietors could stake a claim in the agricultural profits. Two, a constant flow of liquid funds from Punjabi soldiers turned immigrants settled outside Punjab. A large number of Punjabis had settled in other colonies of the British Empire following their recruitment in the British army, posted both within and outside India.³¹

Three, a large section of the non-agricultural classes were employed in regular income-generating activities such as farm labourers and subordinate staff in the government services in a variety of capacities especially when the government infrastructure was expanding to build and administrate railways, roads and canal networks. Thus, the non-agricultural classes had enough liquid funds to enable them to purchase land in open auctions. The land was for both agricultural and non-agricultural uses since the former could be leased for farming to tenant farmers while the latter could be used for commercial activities like opening new shops, factories etc. It is clear that non-agricultural classes had the monetary resources to claim space in the new colonies. The professional moneylenders - Khatri, Aroras and Baniyas - were considered to be the richest among the non-agriculturalist classes and, therefore, constituted the single largest group of buyers.³² These classes could bid for land in open auctions or through illegal *benami* transactions. The latter method entailed the transfer of land on a nominal basis to a peasant's name even though the actual ownership and execution would lie in the hands of the non-agriculturalist buyer.

That the land grants were used as instruments of coercion and inducement in producing an *auxiliary colonist* class is evident in the development of soldier settlements in the colonies. In all, as much as half the total colony land, amounting to half a million acres in various districts, was allotted to the demobilised soldiers.³³ Incidentally, the land grant applications for soldiers were not assessed by the district authorities but rather recommended by the regimental commanders. The eligibility criterion was either exemplary military record or the completion of 21 years of military service. This was certainly an inducement to the soldiers for a prolonged military career and resulted in consolidation of a loyal class of soldier-agriculturalists in Punjab. The social origins of this class combined the ideas of martial races and agricultural castes since the military land grantees were required to belong to the traditional farming communities. The military-farming ties were strengthened by the terms

of grants that demanded regular horse breeding for the army. Such grantees had to maintain mares at the rate of one mare per 40 acres.

In times of war, the military land grants increased as a further inducement to enlist in the British army. For instance, World War I coincided with the development of Lower Bari Doab colony project and the war changed the proportion of military land grants in the original scheme considerably. Of the total 1,192,000 acres in this colony, 100,500 acres (10 percent) were reserved for military regimental farms, and 689,500 acres (57 percent) for horse breeding farms that included war veterans to a large extent. The outbreak of war altered this proportion in favour of war veterans as another 75,000 acres (7 percent) were added to the military land allocation. The increase was spurred by the fact that not only a large number of Punjabi soldiers served in the army at that point, but there was also a huge need to recruit combat soldiers. The British interest in sustaining the military-agrarian rural economy was obvious as the number of cultivator turned soldiers in the army suggest. At the beginning of World War I, 100,000 (65 percent) of the total 152,000 Indian combat troops in the British Indian army came from Punjab. By 1917 recruitments from Punjab accounted for over 117,000 of the total 254,000 soldiers enlisted from India, that is, half the entire Indian military force.

As Ali has suggested, though preservation rather than transformation of prevalent agrarian hierarchy underlay the British attempts to establish new colonies, the military-agrarian logic did have an impact on the social order. It was generally believed that agricultural castes make able soldiers as the recruitment figures from the prosperous farming areas of central Punjab show. The converse belief that good soldiers make able cultivators also came to be accepted as the instance of land allotment to the lower caste *Mazhabi* Sikhs suggests. Evidently, an important change in the policy during the World War I contributed to this reversal, that is, the eligibility to land grants was extended to war veterans and combat soldiers of non-agriculturist caste origins. In the Chenab colony, low caste converts to the Sikh religion *Mazhabis* were granted three villages based on their strength in the three infantry battalions of the 22nd, 23rd and 24th Pioneer regiments.³⁴ *Mazhabi* Sikhs were traditionally considered a non-agriculturist caste and therefore were not eligible for land grants in the colonies. Their conversion to Sikhism, a designated martial race, and then recruitment to army paved a way for social reordering. The land grants were meant as a reward to the community that had readily provided recruits for the army and would continue to provide more in the future. The land holdings in Chenab colony later became a basis for reconsideration of caste status in the agrarian hierarchy and in 1911 *Mazhabis* in Gujranwala and Lyallpur districts were accorded the official status of 'agricultural caste'. Military service as a route to social mobility was clearly upheld in this case since their civilian caste brethren in other districts of Punjab continued to be placed in low social ranks.

Nevertheless, transplantation of traditional social hierarchies was the dominant practice of the colonial state. The chosen way was to grant land to prominent families from *rais*, or rich feudal background in order to extend political influence in that community. In Sohag Para colony, a major land grant

of 7,800 acres (10 percent of total land) was allotted to Baba Sir Khem Singh Bedi who claimed descent from the family of Guru Nanak Dev, the first Sikh guru. The rationale of this unusually large grant to an individual was that the Bedi family had supported the British during the 1857 upheaval and the grant was meant as a reward for this. Moreover, the holy status of the family among Sikhs could help British consolidate influence among Sikhs. The enormity of this grant made it an exception, though it was usual to make land grants to influential families who could be expected to collaborate with the state in times of emergency. The social composition of the colony villages was, thus, in many ways, a reproduction of the social organisation prevalent in Central Punjab. The radical transformation through land grants, if any, was attempted in limited measures only to reward the British loyalist among the natives. It is remarkable that caution was observed not to mix upper castes and lower castes in the new settlements. The land grant to low caste untouchable *Mazhabi* soldiers was undertaken not as a social radicalisation rather as a military reward for loyal service. The social mobility accruing to the land recipients was a mere by product.

The Native Colonisers

Clearly the British could not have extended and consolidated the colonial project in West Punjab the without such auxiliary classes. The historical emergence of a separate class of auxiliary colonists - farmers and traders - facilitated such a project. In turn their participation in such a project changed their personal fortunes as well as their social positioning in contemporary Punjabi society. However, it would be unfair to claim that the native colonisers were aware of their role as colonists, a role which seems so clear with the benefit of hindsight. There are not many personal accounts from the 19th century westwards movement in Punjab that allow us to see what the original colonisers experienced. The following account is gathered from a transcribed personal interview with a peasant farmer who migrated to the newly colonised agricultural land.³⁵ It is one of the few non-official accounts from the colony migrations that open a personal dimension to this movement.

Bhag Singh's grandfather Sardar Shiam Singh migrated to Lyallpur (now Faisalabad in Pakistan) in 1892 or 1893. The family's native place was the village of Dhandra in the district of Ludhiana where Shiam Singh and his three brothers shared ancestral farmlands. Land over-use and lack of enough water in central Punjab had made the fields unproductive and many farmers like Shiam Singh were looking for better farming land. Fortunately for Shiam Singh the British recruitment policy to populate new colonies was directed at 'agricultural castes' like *Arains*, and *Jats*.

Then English rulers devised a plan to develop the uninhabited *bar*³⁶ area in western Punjab and they also prepared a grand plan and map for a city of Lyallpur and the surrounding villages. When all the planning was done, and water was ready for farms, they had

numerous meetings in Ludhiana, Jalandhar and Amritsar persuading farmers to go there. The bar area was all jungle and uninhabited, indeed uninhabitable till then. I have heard that when the Sahib³⁷ came to our area, a drummer went through the village to gather at the bungalow at the canal. The Sahib had come to allocate *murrabas* (25 acres). Our local zaildar (village head) was in the crowd. He was asked by Sahib to go to the bar, but he refused. It became a common saying later that when zaildar went home, his mother asked him why he was so late. Zaildar told his mother, that Sahib wanted to allocate extra ten murrabas in the bar and that he had a difficult time refusing this offer. But Sahib had also told the Zaildar that 'one day you will regret this decision'. The point is that English offered generous terms in allocating new land and there was wide publicity about the new lands available.

The decision to relocate to the new areas was far from easy as the account suggests. The new settlements required hard work in clearing bushes and wild growth all over and then there were risks of confrontation with the local communities, collectively labelled *Junglis*.³⁸ The proprietary claims of the indigenous population were forfeited and the entire area was categorised as crown wasteland. However, the lure of cheap and plentiful land far outweighed the risks involved as a total of 1,824,745 acres of land was finally distributed in the region.³⁹

The aggressive recruitment drive undertaken by the state was made visible by a whole cadre of energetic bureaucrats called Land Settlement Officers. The enthusiasm of these officers is noted in popular local beliefs that 'a man could ask for as much land as he wanted, the more he asked the better it pleased the Sahibs, who happily filled in the squares on their maps.'⁴⁰ There were also seemingly far-fetched stories about the allotment procedure and the friendly attitude of the British officers. A popular one is about:

an enterprising young man got on his horse and rode besides the Sahib, first in one direction and then in another. They rode all day till they arrived back in the evening to where they had started, and that, said this young stalwart, was all his land, if Sahib agreed. The Sahib was only too happy to agree; he would work all night to fill so many more squares in his settlement plans [Ibid].

If we skirt the issue of authenticity of allotment method in this story, then the underlying elements of motivation and inspiration to own vast lands become apparent. In the overpopulated regions of central Punjab this was an almost impossible goal for small and medium farmers whose land was becoming increasingly small with each passing generation. Anyhow, very large landholdings were not to become a norm in the colonies either since over 30 percent of the total colony land was allotted to peasant-cultivators with average holding between 15-50 acres. But an exception to this was Chenab colony

scheme in and around Lyallpur, under which 78.3 percent of the land was allotted to small and medium peasants⁴¹ like Bhag Singh's grandfather who applied for and was granted a tract of 25 acres. The first journey to the new colonies has since become part of the larger story of Punjabi grit and enterprise.

My grandfather went to bar as the land allocated to us was marked out by local officials. He had his son on his shoulders; other essential supplies were also taken up on the first trip. You can imagine what kinds of things were taken to the bar. Ploughs, animals, buffaloes, bullocks, cart and hand driven *chakkian* (grinders) were among the essential items. Many, as they reached the bar were disappointed with the first look of the land, there were no villages. It was all wasteland with jungle with a lot of dense trees and moth growth. There were no villages. It required intense work initially to get all the unwanted bushes out of the way and level the land. When the land was bared and cultivated, it became more interesting work. Soon women were called on the second trip to bar and they provided the essential support and made a home by putting hearth and furnace in the new village which was a pencil plan yet on the paper handed down by Sahibs to the lower officials. Farmers were very impressed for such high level planning but there were no signs of village or community at that time.

A high degree of planning was quite a visible characteristic of the new settlements. The new settlements were quite different from the walled city models prevalent in the 19th century Punjab. This was not surprising since the British found the condition of most Punjab towns 'unhealthy, noisy and distasteful'⁴² and therefore tried creating 'anglicised' colonies in western Punjab. The ideas of hygiene, sanitation, civic regulations were concretised in the new colony towns and villages formed around geometric square or rectangles.

The houses (in the village) were all mud houses but these were constructed to a planned structure outlined by the English administrators. Lyallpur city was worth a visit then; it had eight bazaars, two internal ones were almost circular in that you could walk through anyone of them to reach city centre. We used to call them *Gol* (circular) bazaar. Most villages were planned. They all had a well at its centre. This was dug up by the settlers. There were usually four lanes cross-cutting each other, each such lane had places for 6 houses on either side. Thus village was like a square cut through a number of streets each leading to the village centre. It was a simple and elegant plan. Farmers made their own houses; all were allocated certain area in the street. As the village was constructed by the allottees, some of the streets came to be called on older pattern of Punjab villages. Our village had three main

pattis (subdivisions), ours was called *Khirkian* (airy, or one with windows), another was *Bhola Singh di patti* (probably named after a prominent resident) and the third was known as *Mahilan valian di patti* (literally, palatial residences), named so presumably because these people had two storey houses in their older villages.

The settlements were supposed to be experiments in socio-economic model development for the rest of the Punjab for which ‘healthy agricultural communities “of the best Punjab type” would be established and kept under supervision ... this would demonstrate to other Punjabis how proper sanitation, careful economic planning and cooperation with government could result in a higher standard of living.’⁴³ The planning in the colonies indeed was on a new model based on traditions that the British thought best reflected the Punjabi social hierarchy. Each colony had a ‘colonisation officer’ who was solely responsible for it. The settlements were divided according to religion and caste into small administrative areas called *chak*, wherein previous arrangements for sanitation and orderly bazaars etc had been made. Each *chak* was demarcated into villages, market towns and agricultural belts. Each peasant received their allotted land grant along with a designated plot for a house and a stable. The civic duties of the peasant grantees, outlined in the ‘The Punjab Colony Manual’ included, permanent residence on the farm, cutting wood from specified areas, maintaining a clean compound and to make arrangements for sanitary disposal of the night soil.⁴⁴ The colonisation officer and his subordinates supervised all the minor details in the colony to ensure each colonist fulfilled his condition and contributed to the community feeling. Clearly, this was a new social arrangement conceptualised and executed by the modern state authorities that replaced the previous forms of village level social deliberations.

These settlements were seen as novel examples of modern planning and the residents saw themselves as part of a larger scheme of development. The new-age feeling of the colonies is reflected in another colony town, Sargodha where not only is settlement noted as ‘planned, well laid out (with) plenty of light and air and its streets and lanes were wide and straight’ but that ‘there was more social and political awakening in Sargodha; its municipal affairs were better run; its communities had started new schools; the singing and dancing girls were moved out of the city, first near the canal bank, and then still further away; it was typical of the new spirit of Sargodha that its *biradaris* tried to stop wasteful expenditure at weddings by banning fireworks, and had they got away with this they would probably have stopped music and entertainment as well.’⁴⁵

This seemingly forward movement was not limited to buildings and town planning as social and moral visions of society could be seen in the designated spatial layout. The notions that informed the distribution of space were transmuted from the dominant ideas of the Victorian age and the colonial vision of native society, its peculiar institutions of caste and innumerable religious cults that could not always be straitjacketed in monopolistic religions. The new establishments not only required schools, hospitals and market places but also physical space for religious practices. But the difficult question was which

religious cults should be granted space in the new settlements? The problem was especially compounded in Punjab where *Sufi* inspired syncretic, locally rooted traditions abounded and it was common to have a 'protective deity on the boundaries of the hamlet, that, among other functions, safeguarded its inhabitants from the pernicious influence of outsiders: be it people from other villages, malevolent spirits or the state.'⁴⁶ The final provision of 'an orthodox Hindu temple, an Arya Samaj temple a Muslim mosque and a Sikh gurdwara'⁴⁷ in towns like Sargodha and Lyallpur reflect the colonial interpretation of religious preferences in the region. It is remarkable that Arya Samaj temples had already become part of the tradition in the new colonies even though its advent in Punjab was as recent as the late 19th century as we will see below.

There were two simultaneous developments in colonial India that coincided with the construction of canal colonies and impacted on the spatial layout of the settlements. One, the practice of undertaking population census surveys in 1868 was introduced wherein religious and caste affiliations of individuals were noted and two, religious reform movements among Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs that sought identities exclusively in local syncretic cults, which were gaining ground. The monopolistic religious identities were encouraged by the colonial administration as they made the task of classification of information and consequently the task of governance easier. This 'straightening technique' was similarly employed to classify castes and communities into broad divisions of agricultural and non-agricultural castes and then allocate them space accordingly. The result was that even in the planned colonies, 'there remained a caste or religious grouping in these blocks as in the *mohallas* (subdivisions) of the old towns' and 'the lower castes, as in the old towns, lived on the outskirts of the urban (and rural) centers.'⁴⁸ While land allotments in the colonies were largely made to the newly instituted 'agricultural castes' other castes accompanied them in pursuit of livelihood.

They all followed them. Chamar, Nai, Jhinwar⁴⁹ and others. From our village Dhandra a number of such people migrated to support Jats and adopted their professions. Our village eventually also had one lane full of Muslims who acted mainly as labourers for farmers. All menials of the village *Nai* (barber), *bhrai* (water carrier), *laagi* (matchmaker) were there, village had them all. The Government had allocated for each permanent *laagi* half an acre of land. Not only that, half an hour of water also. However, later on, the Government took this land back and land was sold to the highest bidder. The *bania* (petty merchant) also came along. Every village had allotment for shops just besides the central well.

To a large extent, the preservation of old social order was definitely a concern in the new settlements both for the colonial state and the subjects.

Our village was in *chak*⁵⁰ no. 74 and two other villages of people from Dhandra were in *chak* no. 46 and 66. The latter had some

migrants from Majha region also. Similarly, chak no. 91, 92, 93, 94 had villagers from Mullanpur in Ludhiana. Our neighbouring villages were also 'pure'; each village drew settlement from just a single village from the old districts. Most chaks were mixed. Ours were pure, and we had many advantages over the 'mixed' ones: we knew each other well, this worked well for the village cohesion, our village had never the kind of disputes over the allocation of water, for example, and many other villages usually had that often. Our new village had altogether 1250 acres and these were allocated to farmers from Dhandra alone. The village had 100-125 acres of surplus land. Our elders were anxious that non-Dhandra villagers should not settle in the new village. They encouraged those families to buy an extra 25 acres who had a son of 20 years old, his moustache just growing and promising youth. In this way, three or four families bought the extra land. In our village there was just a lone family from another village, an exception which was tolerated by the elders.

The acquisition of land by members of one clan and caste group was important not only to enhance their class power in Punjab polity, but also to control a physical place to practice specific ideas of social behaviour and pre-empt the arrival of other caste or social groups in their own territory. The internal hierarchies among the deemed agricultural castes - at times based on regional origins within different districts of Punjab - also played a role in defining 'insiders' and 'outsiders' and consequently their place in the new villages. The social interaction in the new villages was patterned on the beliefs and rituals prevalent in the old communities. But soon an independent social universe emerged in the colonies where the structure was still the same but the contracting members were procured in the colonies and were no longer brought in from the old districts.

At first marriages took place in Ludhiana villages. However soon after settlement, many relationships developed in the colony itself. People were engaged and married across the local villages. Then the marriages party stayed for full three days. There were many novel practices in the colony areas. Similarly no one who died in the colony was brought back. Everyone was put on fire pyres there with last rites read by the *granthi* (Sikh priest).

An interesting aspect of the emerging social order was state patronage to influential men in the communities who became the harbingers of colonial state policies in the region. The incursion of these community leaders into political arbitration points to some of the reasons why response to the emerging nationalist movement was lukewarm in the colonies.

The village head was *lumbardar* who was usually chosen from among the leading men of the village. They were given 12 and a half acres of land free. Besides they had to have a mare - a fit mare - which was periodically mated with a donkey and the resulting sibling was given to the state. State needed these for their army. I had no interest in politics. Like many other youth, I was only interested ploughing the land and sitting idle in the village. Heavyweights in the village were the *lumbardars*. They would never speak against the Government. Yes, elders and father used to tell us how Congress-walas instigated this (against land levy) agitation. There were processions and petitions in Lyallpur colonies. Leaders argued that the Government has provided canals, but haven't they got their money worth on these canals. Why are farmers still being charged for water? We should not pay any land revenue. In our village, Harbhajan Singh who had six sons was always interested in such matters. He used to drink water from the well and used steel utensils for eating as a strictly religious man. He had been arrested in this agitation; he used to stay for six months. He was always arguing with anyone who cared to listen, that Government is not dealing fairly with farmers.

The account suggests that dissent was not very widespread since the lone dissenter Harbhajan Singh is distinctly recalled for his unusual behaviour. The activities of the Congress Party seemingly did not garner much local support in the colonies. Political influence here, if any, rested with the religious-political *Akali* movement among Sikhs and otherwise, the secular Unionist Party at all-Punjab level. And neither of these groups were particularly known for their anti-colonial stance. Despite low levels of support for the Congress-led independence movement, the announcement of colonial withdrawal and ensuing communal violence changed the situation.

Our family was in the bar for 55 years. When announcement came regarding Pakistan, we were told that moving is necessary. Many people still thought that it is all nonsense. We should not move. Then suddenly everything changed when murders came along. Sikh leaders ran through the villages, including Giani Kartar Singh. They told us to get ready for permanent movement back to native lands. We were to join the Sargodha *kafila* (caravan). We had four carts, one carried *sandook* (large storage box), packed with many things including our food. Another cart was full of animal feed. Luckily, we had sent all children and young women earlier on army trucks. You see we had some relatives in the army. When they passed through our village to rescue Jhang's Sikh population of Bhapas and Aroras (contemptuous terms for non-Jat, mercantile castes), they told us to get all our women and children on the road the following day. They took good care of them and we

were spared the worst scenes of massacre as our women and children were safely transported to the border. Our caravan was 10 miles long. At the border we were met by our relatives (from the old village) waiting on the road. They told us that we should be going to a new place called Gagra near Jagraon in Ludhiana district. We did not go back to Dhandra village as we had little land there. Dhandra hadn't much Muslim population, so there wasn't much surplus land. Moreover, our relatives had got (rest of) the land there by the time we returned. All refugees were given 12 acres irrespective of the (extent) of land they had in bar. We occupied the houses vacated by the departing Muslims. It was just 'grab and occupy' policy.

Though the journey back was long, arduous and fraught with risks of attack, the *Jat* Sikhs were better prepared with their bullock carts, enough food reserves and were at times equipped with weapons for defence since many colonists were former soldiers. The role of Akali Sikh leaders was crucial in disseminating political information, motivating decisions to leave and then strategically organising the actual movement. But safe journey was just a prelude to another act of settlement, this time in central Punjab. The land crunch in the region had not eased despite large-scale migration to the colonies half a century ago and therefore not enough land was available for distribution among the returnees. Moreover, the extent of cultivatable area abandoned by Hindu and Sikhs outside towns in western Punjab amounted to 5,264,769 acres, that is, roughly 25 per cent more than the 4,120,621 acres left by the Muslim evacuees in eastern Punjab. But homecoming was more complicated than problems of renewed allocation of land among the returnees who were now officially proclaimed 'refugees'.

We were taunted with the term, sometimes called *panahgeer* (the one who seeks shelter). Look, a refugee is here. We would say 'we are your brothers'. We would argue that we are not refugees, and we have come back to our native lands, we had everything here. But natives would not look at it this way. Some did help, others were hostile. Refugee was a tag we carried for years and felt ashamed whenever the term was mentioned.

The label of being a 'refugee' appears here more as a social stigma and less as an official-legal term as is commonly understood. The description of the 'returnees' to their native lands as 'refugees' in less than five decades clearly shows the temporary fleeting character of these labels. While the colonists from West Punjab still imagined themselves to have come back to their original homeland, they are no longer recognised by others as such. It is particularly significant fact that religion (Sikhism), caste (Jats), occupation, and social traditions creates no instant sense of identity between the returnees and the locals. Their journey to the canal colonies had somehow cheated them of their

nativity in East Punjab that no claim to common brotherhood could seemingly restore. What made them different from the natives was the immediate struggle over the claim to resources and opportunities that they had to undertake all over again. However, the task of starting their lives all over again coupled with frequent negotiations for social space with the locals did not stop the 'refugees' from experimenting and taking new initiatives.

In our new village, we experimented with a cooperative society, pooling our resources together. Eight families joined together to form an agricultural cooperative. The society bought a tractor. Duties among all its able members were divided, paying equally Rupees 45 per month to each. A manager kept accounts of income and expenses. Our 'refugee methods' were imitated by natives here. We were first to arrange for underground water for our farms, and adopted new seeds enthusiastically. We were several years ahead than farmers here in doing all sorts of farm practices. These people would laugh and mock us at our risks but we knew it pays to experiment. Hence I was the first to grow a variety of vegetables and cash crops as Gagra village is near Jagraon town with a ready market for fresh produce. Later a number of other farmers followed our family's methods. Similarly we invested much money in machinery, buying tractor first and dug a tubewell for underground water. This obviously paid in higher yields.

A sense of enterprise and boldness in trying out new farming techniques is clearly visible in this account. The formation of cooperatives is yet another indication of willingness to try new forms and methods. The displacement from one place to another opens possibilities of breaking with the settled traditions and experiment with the new. This was visible in the colony movement and when the new arrivals from East Punjab started new social traditions like incurring less expense on weddings. The new reformist religious movements easily took ground in the newly settlement areas as is evident from the predominance of Akali Party which was the political face of the Singh Sabha movement.

There seems to be a repetition of the entire sequence in moving and settling, confronting the challenges of physical movement with a sense of adventure and experimenting with new ideas in the new settlement. The first time in living memory that this takes place is early in the 20th century and the second time in the mid 20th century. The idea of movement does not appear as 'uprooting' or being torn apart from the native soil. It is seen as yet another significant marker of change in one's personal history. It is not uncommon among an older generation of Punjabis to bear names like *Musafir*, the traveller or *Vilayati*, the foreigner, which indicates that the movement has been a part of the tradition for a long time. Such continued tradition can be witnessed in Delhi in the names some shops still bear, especially in the Punjabi refugee-dominated areas like Karol Bagh market, where for instance a number of shops go by the name of

Pardesi, the alien. There are *Pardesi* tailors, dry cleaners, fruit sellers among others who display their alien origins in Delhi, neither with particular pride nor as a dramatic statement of their origin, but rather as a plain matter of fact.

It is clear that generational experiences of movement clearly have a bearing, explicit or implicit, on the way one confronts movement. However, these personal experiences of movement need to be comprehended both within and outside their historical context. In the late 19th century mass population movement took place under a colonial plan to irrigate previously uncultivable, sparsely populated areas of Punjab. This meant that technical engineering feats could not be accomplished and taken to a logical conclusion without the participation of the Punjab peasantry. For a number of reasons the canal colony movement became a paramount project for the colonial administration in Punjab.

Government + One = Majority

The concretisation of a new auxiliary class involved radical upheavals in the social hierarchies prevalent in Punjab. As noted earlier, the mid-till-late 19th century period was also significant in converting local, often oral, definitions and categories of different caste and religious affiliations into administrative and legal codes. The prime source of knowledge for the colonial administration was population censuses, surveys, recorded folktales, travelogues by fellow British and ethnographic narratives of people and their customs.⁵¹ The quest for ethnographic knowledge had an administrative edge for it helped the colonial rulers to know and create 'social categories by which India was ordered for administrative purposes.'⁵² This is a widely perceived opinion whereby the colonial period in India is seen as a crucial turning point for Indian society since the colonial intervention turned fluid personal and social distinctions into permanent 'facts'.⁵³ The social turmoil and upheavals in colonial Punjab show that often, communal groups strategically employed state influence to tilt the balance in their favour. It is not surprising, therefore, that an old Punjabi idiom suggests, 'government plus one equals a majority'. Thus, it was not just the state that was manoeuvring various communities into governable categories; the community groups were also making use of the state to their own ends. This proposition will become much clearer with the following examples and a brief description of the religious reform movements that took strong roots in colonial Punjab.

In this paper, discussion of the rise and concretisation of the non-agriculturist classes in the social hierarchy of Punjab is the most significant. This follows the definition of exclusive religious identities - Hindu and Sikh - out of fuzzy localised religious beliefs. Harjot Oberoi in his study on religion in colonial Punjab has very convincingly shown how religious boundaries were constructed to produce discrete and immutable categories of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims. The grand religions like Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism replaced the popular syncretic culture of worshipping local village deities, *sufis*, and *pirs* whose shrines were visited by the locals irrespective of their professed faith. The

religious reform movements like *Arya Samaj* (Hindu), *Singh Sabhas* (Sikh) and *Ahmadiyahs* (Muslim) gained ground rapidly in late 19th century. A cataclysmic question that each reform movement attempted to answer was how they (the natives of Hindustan) came to be subjected by the British colonisers. The introspection into their state of subjectivity produced an introspective survey of their own past that had led to the present circumstances. Such an enquiry also entailed knowledge of how the British became the ruling class.

The late 18th century social reformers like Ram Mohan Roy found the native society to be plagued with internal conflicts - based on caste hierarchies, religious differences; social evils - like *sati*, ban on widow remarriage, dowry and child marriage which together rendered Indians morally weak and defenceless to face the onslaught from outside. Thus he founded a socio-religious mission called *Brahmo Samaj* that sought to bridge internal differences and publicly battled the 'social evils' highlighted earlier. This mission was brought to Punjab by Bengali government employees who were sent to assist in the administration of the newly annexed regions of Punjab. The English educated Punjabis, primarily Hindus, were attracted to Brahmo Samaj as according to Jones 'they accepted the Bengali models of modernity.' But with the emergence of an indigenous educated class in Punjab, Brahmo ideals were discarded in favour of a more aggressive sect called Arya Samaj.

The formation of Arya Samaj and its popularity among the non-agricultural castes was a decisive influence on the social organisation in Punjab. The leader of Arya Samaj, Swami Dayanand, arrived in Punjab in 1877 and established a series of Arya Samaj centres throughout the region. The introspective mode of the early reformers now became more pronounced in Arya Samaj for whom the subjectivity to the natives had accrued from forgetfulness of their own glorious tradition and history. Dayanand saw the ancient scriptures, collectively called *Vedas*, as the epitome of rich infallible knowledge which had not been optimised because of the divisive caste system, Brahmanical domination, polytheistic idol worship and useless rituals. He advocated a reversion to the Vedas as the only path to modern self-discovery of Hindus. At this point, many educated Sikhs became members of Arya Samaj to begin with and the lines between what was Hindu or Sikh were still unclear. One of the main hosts of Dayanand in Lahore was a Sikh aristocrat Sardar Vikramjit Singh Ahluwalia and later many of his key followers were Sikhs like Bhai Jawahar Singh, Bhagat Lakshman Singh among others. The Sikh members of the Samaj were the moving force behind the *Shuddhi*, or purification movements in Punjab. The Arya Samaj became a proselytising faith, in a major departure from Hindu traditions, and in the absence of any Hindu purification rituals took to Sikh baptism practices of holy water and recitation of verses from *Guru Granth Sahib*. The radical groups among the Samaj had developed a 'pork test' for the converts to Hinduism and Sikhism. The logic was that if the eating of beef could defile a Hindu and turn him into a Muslim then the eating of pork must signify the opposite. The Shuddhi ceremonies were mainly aimed at reconversion of Christian and Muslim converts back to Hinduism. According to Jones the success of Christian missionaries in Punjab in converting untouchable castes

was considered the main threat as the 1891 census showed an increase of 410 percent of native Christians in Punjab.

The Hindu-Sikh partnership against Islam and Christianity began floundering when a more vociferous group among Aryas began criticising the founder of the Sikh faith, Guru Nanak as an uneducated man who had no knowledge of Vedas and therefore was not infallible. Sikhism was seen as another form of Hindu revivalism and Sikhs were designated as the martial arm of the Hindus. The Sikh members, many of who resigned from Arya Samaj, did not take the public denigration of Guru Nanak very kindly. Kenneth Jones has pointed to the tense Arya-Sikh relations that, through a series of attacks and counterattacks in print - pamphlets, short histories, newspapers and journals - tried to answer the question 'are Sikhs Hindus?'. In the process of Sikh identification at the turn of the 20th century, print media, both in English and local languages seemed to be a popular channel for deliberations. Not unsurprisingly therefore, the question was answered in the form of two short tracts, first by Bawa Narain Singh called *Sikh Hindu Hain*, or Sikhs are Hindus and then by Sardar Kahn Singh entitled *Ham Hindu Nahin*, or We are not Hindus. The discourse created through these writings and speeches provided a suitable backdrop to a personal legal case that gave definitive contours to the discourse itself.

Hindu-Sikh tensions would have remained at an argumentative level if not for the state intervention sought by a widow deprived of her husband's property. In 1898, Sardar Dayal Singh Majithia, a Sikh aristocrat and benefactor died leaving his vast wealth in a trust called Dyal Singh Trust. His widow contested the will on the grounds that Dayal Singh had given away his property under the Hindu law that was not applicable since he was a Sikh. The task of defining whether Sikhs were Hindus or not, now fell upon the court. The court case became the battleground on which identity issues were now being sorted out. The larger identification debates hinged upon the dead man's identity and the case assumed a far greater relevance than to the original claimant. The entry of the state, through the case, also meant that the state was henceforth a party to these debates. This may also explain the frequent use of print media, including the English language, to gain the attention of the government officials. The more profitable way to publicise such opinions among the Sikh or Hindu followers would be address the daily or weekly congregations in the temples. In the Sikh Gurudwaras, the tradition of addressing the congregation after the prayers still remains a powerful tool among the religious preachers, which the Sikh militant leader Bhindranwale used quite effectively as late as the 1980s from the premises of the Golden Temple in Punjab.

The identity battle became even shriller when the court pronounced Dyal Singh to be a Hindu. This was not particularly surprising because the British from the sacred Vedic scriptures derived much of the legal knowledge about the native manners and customs. Himani Banerjee has shown how the late 18th century lawmakers like William Jones, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Bengal, chose to rely upon the Sanskrit texts and ancient scriptures to frame the basis of a Hindu legal code that could be readily interpreted and applied by a

British magistrate.⁵⁴ Most Sanskrit texts, quite naturally, did not include latter day developments like the new religions and their practices like Sikhism. Most likely such legal knowledge was made use of to describe Dyal Singh a Hindu at his death. A firm outcome of the case, besides the actual pronouncement, was that the colonial state was henceforth recognised as a party to the Hindu-Sikh problematic. The activists on both sides had understood that if one has the government on one's side, then victory is almost assured. Thus, each side tried to appeal to the state to intervene in its favour.

In 1900 another opportunity was presented to the Arya-Sikh proponents to publicly state their claims when a group of untouchable Rahtia Sikhs announced their intention of converting to Arya Samaj according to the newly prescribed *Shuddhi* rituals of wearing the sacred thread, shaving off their hair (sacred for Sikhs), accepting upper caste rituals of bathing and purification and inter-dining with the upper caste Aryas. Despite warnings, the ceremony was performed publicly among a large crowd of onlookers, which the Sikhs saw as a public humiliation and a provocation to their faith. By now they had also realised that the greatest threat to the state was any possibility of disturbance in the law and order situation. Thus, a Sikh journal appealed for state intervention in the following words 'a fire has been lit on the 3rd of June 1900 (the date of ceremony), which if not got down in time might spread and consume them all. If the matters reached that, it would be difficult for any community nay even for the Government, to put down the mischief without having recourse to violence. He (Sikhs) regarded the conduct of the Aryas as neither more nor less than an attempt at mischief'.

A few months later, this issue assumed violent proportions when the converted Rahtias tried to draw water from the common village well. This was seen as an Arya provocation aimed at disturbing the social traditions and balance. Once again the Sikhs reminded and appealed to the government that 'the Arya Samajists will bear whatever lot is in store for them, but it is the Government of the day that will suffer whose administration will be disturbed.' The appeal was also laced with threats to induce state intervention that 'we did the most ordinary thing in the world by pointing to our rulers ... the consequences might be unpleasant. We hoped that this warning would enable the officers of the Government to keep an eye over the manner in which the Aryas would behave in the matter.'⁵⁵ Clearly, the colonial state had become a party to the debate, first due to its own policies of social engineering in creating caste and religious categories and secondly, due to the constant appeals by the different groups. The lesson learnt from the Majithia case was that the state legislations and ordinances were the surest way of achieving one's objective. The Sikhs converted this into a strategy when they launched Tat Khalsa and later Singh Sabha movement to reclaim the control of Sikh shrines from Hindu priests. The Sikhs had a clear victory when the Government established the Gurudwara Act in 1925 following a prolonged agitation that gave an elected Sikh body - Singh Sabha - the right to administrate Sikh shrines. Significantly the agitation was produced out of the Arya-Sikh tensions but the appeal for the control of the Sikh shrines was made to the colonial state rather than sorting out

the matters without state interference. Thus, the victories achieved by the Sikh community simultaneously recognised the authority of the British Indian government.

The late 19th century religious reforms had a distinct impact on the social organisation in Punjab. The success of Arya Samaj among the intermediate professional moneylender castes was primarily because Arya Samaj did not advocate the Brahmanical caste hierarchies that placed Brahmins on top. This suited the middle castes - Khatri, Aroras and Banias - because they had considerable economic influence in Punjab, which turned into social gains with the popularity of Arya Samaj casteless ideologies. A large number of the Arya Samaj adherents and the leadership came from these non-agrarian but economically influential groups. The Brahmins, as a consequence, declined in the social hierarchy because many among the middle castes - mainly Khatri - became Western-educated professionals who did not disdain their traditional profession of commerce. This gave them both a social advantage as well as economic power to entrench themselves as the new Punjabi elite. The Arya Samaj entered Punjab at such a historical moment when an upwardly mobile group was seeking social leadership as well. On the other hand, the traditional agricultural castes like Jats emerged as another component of the new elite. This was achieved, to a large extent, through military services rendered to the colonial state and land grants in return. There was, of course, not a strict divide between the agricultural or non-agricultural classes as the state had intended since many Hindu and Sikh Khatri owned land in the new canal colonies - either through legal or illegal means - while Jats had gained similar social mobility through western education and migration abroad.

Conclusions

Three broad conclusions can be drawn following our discussions on the late 19th century: West Punjab colony migration, class formation among Punjabis and the religious reform movements popular in Punjab. Firstly, the idea of deep-rooted linkages between people and places stands challenged. The Punjabis were bound, through frequent migration, to more than one place. This knowledge, for instance, helps us to explain the lack of nostalgia among the Punjabi migrants in Delhi. The canal colony migrations meant that, in many cases, the same individuals had experienced double migration within their lifetimes. From Bhag Singh's account, it is clear that in the colony areas the residents still thought of East Punjab as their native land. This idea of native land was yet to fade in their living memory when they were forced to migrate once again. While the Jat farmers went back to East Punjab farmlands, the urbanised commercial castes found their way into urban centres. A large part of that population came to Delhi. The canal migrations had helped concretise an entire enterprising class of Hindus and Sikhs who were used to migrating and resettling when new occupational opportunities arose. The lure of concessional farmland and fresh business prospects attracted an entire population of Hindus and Sikhs from East Punjab.

Secondly, the commonsense ability to approach resettlement, forming associations with a new place, does not challenge the immediate trauma of loss of home. The tradition of frequent mobility, however, equips the migrants with a metaphorical 'travel kit' that allows them to create homes in new places. Association with multiple places also means that the idea of belonging is dispersed and not concentrated on a single location. For an older generation of original Partition migrants, many of whom have deceased by now, Partition was not the first major displacement in their lifetimes. Thirdly, and finally, the historical context of the late 19th century helps lay a foundation for us to better understand the Hindu-Sikh rupture that takes place after Partition.

Notes

¹ This is a biographical extract from the life story of Balraj Sahni, a well renowned Hindi film actor who had migrated from Punjab in 1947 to join the film industry in Bombay. The family had earlier migrated from Kabul in Afghanistan the memories of which seem to be part of the family tales. See Bhisham Sahni (1981), *Balraj: My Brother* (Publisher unknown), p. 3.

² The notion of 'roots' stands contested when events, historical and contemporary, are looked from the vantage point of travel and movement. James Clifford offers the notion of 'routes' as a useful way of negotiating and challenging the categories of locals and travellers. Liisa Malki, Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson also point to the widely held commonsensical assumptions that link people with place, territory and nation. Thus travel, movement and displacement are seen as a disruption in human life rather than as a frequent feature that links people to more places than one.

³ In 1947, the partition of British India into the independent states of India and Pakistan saw approximately half a million casualties and 25 million people who were forcibly moved across the newly carved borders. The figures are based on estimates derived from decadal demographic changes in 1941 and 1951 population censuses. The total non-Muslim population in West Punjab was a little more than 4 million while the North West Frontier Province adds another 2.8 million non-Muslims who could migrate. Similarly, the Muslim population in East Punjab was 4.5 million in addition to over 300,000 Delhi Muslims who risked becoming homeless. These figures do not include those who got killed, were forcibly or voluntarily converted to Islam, or simply refused to move away. The Punjab figures also do not include Muslim migration from United Provinces to West Punjab which would raise the estimates considerably.

⁴ Personal interview, Amar Colony in Lajpat Nagar, December 2001.

⁵ K.L. Tuteja (2000) *Partition of India* (Hurst & Co), p. 3.

⁶ For details on early and medieval India see Romila Thapar (1987), *The History of India Vol. I*. (Penguin History).

⁷ M. S. Randhawa (1954) *Out of Ashes: An Account of the Rehabilitation of Refugees from West Pakistan in Rural Areas of East Punjab*, p. 53.

⁸ Partha Chatterjee (1993) *The Nation and its Fragments* (Princeton University Press), p. 35.

⁹ See for example Richard Fox's (1984) essay 'Urban Class and Communal Consciousness in Colonial Punjab: The Genesis of India's Intermediate Regime', *Modern Asian Studies*, Volume 18(3) where he traces the class struggle inherent in the social conflicts in colonial Punjab.

¹⁰ For a good discussion on social organization in India, see Martin Orans (1969) 'Social Organization' *Biennial Review of Anthropology*, Volume 6.

¹¹ Marx wrote two articles in New York Daily Tribune about village communities in India which are since reproduced in innumerable publications. For example see Karl Marx (1951) 'Articles of India', ____ (1965) 'Pre Capitalist Economic Formations' and also Marx and Engels (1959) 'First Indian War of Independence'.

¹² G. L. Sharma (2003), *Caste, Class and Social Inequality*, (Mangal Deep), p. 9.

¹³ The observations and anecdotes from travel in India can be found in Abbe Dubois (1981) 'Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies'

¹⁴ See Harjot Oberoi (1994) *The Construction of Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity and Diversity in the Sikh Tradition* (Oxford University Press) and Anshu Malhotra (2002) *Gender, Caste and Religious Identities: Restructuring Class in Colonial Punjab*, (Oxford University Press). The point of departure in both these studies is the 1881 Census and the various un/intended anomalies that it produced.

¹⁵ The most insightful description of this caste categorization is narrated by Ibbetson himself in the foreword to his chapter on castes (later reproduced as a popular reference book called 'Punjab Castes' that has run into several reprints) He mentions the difficulties and obvious irritation in getting people to give 'correct answers' to his queries on 'caste' that as a term has no direct translation or meaning therefore in Punjabi or Hindi. The nearest equivalents used were 'quam', 'zat', 'got'/'shakh' i.e., tribe/nation, clan or family name respectively and they were quite ambiguous or misleading in how people identified themselves socially. See Ibbetson (1993) *Punjab Castes*, pp. 32-37.

¹⁶ Ibbetson, p. 3.

¹⁷ Dipankar Gupta (2000), *Interrogating Caste: Understanding Hierarchy and Difference in Indian Society* (Penguin Books), pp. 34-35.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 72.

¹⁹ Widows who burn themselves upon their dead husband's funeral pyre not only redeem themselves but also bring glory and upward mobility to the caste group. See Kumkum Sangri and Sudesh Vaid (1996) 'Institutions, Beliefs, Ideologies: Widow Immolation in Contemporary Rajasthan' in Kumari Jayawardena and Malathi de Alwis edited *Embodied Violence: Communalising Women's Sexuality in South Asia*, (Kali).

²⁰ D. Washbrook, 'Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India,' *Modern Asian Studies* 15, 3 (1981), p. 650.

²¹ Imran Ali (1988) *The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1855-1947* (Princeton), p. 114.

²² Fox (1984), pp. 464-67.

²³ Ali (1988), p. 140.

²⁴ NG Barrier (1967) 'The Punjab Disturbances of 1907 and the Response of the British Government in India to Agrarian Unrest', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 355.

²⁵ Ibbetson, p. 102, 118.

²⁶ Sir Macolm Lyall Darling, ICS (1904-36) quoted in M.S. Randhawa (1954), p. 39.

²⁷ Ali (1988), p. 47.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

²⁹ This view was openly aired in the 1880's by a young administrative officer called SS Thorburn who was considered sympathetic to the peasants. See Thorburn (1886), *Musalms and the Moneylenders in the Punjab* (Publisher unknown)

³⁰ Mufakharul Islam (1995), 'The Punjab Land Alienation Act and the Professional Moneylenders', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 29, No.2, p. 274.

³¹ For instance, in 1892 there was a flow of contract labour imported from Punjab, to East Africa when British initiated work on Mombassa - Lake Victoria railway project to connect Uganda and Kenya. Similarly in 1897 a contingent of British Sikh soldiers travelled to London through Canada, a British protectorate, to join the diamond jubilee celebrations of Queen Victoria's enthronement. On their return journey some soldiers chose to stay while others went back carrying the stories of plentiful availability of farmland. This induced many Punjabis to migrate to Canada and United States. On Canadian Punjabi diaspora see Archana Verma (2002) *The Making of Little Punjab in Canada: Patterns of Immigration*, (New Delhi: Sage).

³² H Calvert (1922) 'The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab' quoted in Mufakharul Islam (1995), p. 285.

³³ Ali (1988), p. 114.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 112

³⁵ This life story is gathered from a full-length interview conducted by Darshan Singh Tatla in 1996. It was produced and presented verbatim in his paper 'The Sandal Bar: Memoirs of a Jat Sikh Farmer' at the 14th European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies in Copenhagen, 1996.

³⁶ Bar means land between two rivers.

³⁷ Sahib pertains to a person of higher rank. Here it refers to British officers.

³⁸ Jungli is the one who inhabits Jungle or is deemed as being uncivilized.

³⁹ Ali (1988), p. 22.

⁴⁰ Parkash Tandon (1988), *Punjabi Century 1857-1947*, p. 144.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁴² Jacqueline Tyrwhit (1947) 'Patrick Geddes in India' quoted in Reeta Grewal (1988).

⁴³ A British officer called Popham Young quoted in Barrier (1967), p. 356.

⁴⁴ J Beazly and F Puckle 'The Punjab Colony Manual' quoted in N Gerald Barrier (1967), p. 357.

⁴⁵ Tandon (1988), p. 147.

⁴⁶ Oberoi (1991), p. 15.

⁴⁷ Tandon (1988), p. 147.

⁴⁸ Grewal (1988), p. 128.

⁴⁹ These are low-caste groups engaged in various menial tasks.

⁵⁰ A colony village.

⁵¹ For the enumerative and knowledge seeking modalities of the colonial state see, Bernard Cohn (1996) *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Himani Banerjee (2001), *Inventing Subjects: Studies in Hegemony, Patriarchy and Colonialism*, (Anthem Press).

⁵² See Cohn (1996), p. 8.

⁵³ See for example the essays in subaltern studies series on Indian history that primarily focus on the colonial and post-colonial history, circumventing questions about the pre-colonial period. It often remains unclear which aspects of Indian society were 'invented' by British and which were authentically pre-British.

⁵⁴ See Himani Banerji (2001) 'Writing 'India', 'Doing Ideology': William Jones Construction of India as an Ideological Category' in her collection of essays in *Inventing Subjects: Studies In Hegemony, Patriarchy and Colonialism*.

⁵⁵ Quoted from *Khalsa* dated 8th August 1900.